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Highlights 
 Derives general principles of fiscal federalism, adapting them to the metropolitan 
transportation finance context. 
*Manuscript
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 Examining Portuguese metropolitan transportation through the fiscal federalist lens 
reveals problems with fiscal equivalency, equity, transparency, and fiscal stability. 
 A new metropolitan transportation authority law will not likely ameliorate fundamental 
problem, due to unclear financial details. 
 New authorities should begin with transport system finance analysis through the fiscal 
federalist lens and pilot grants for inter-municipal transport projects.
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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal federalism refers to the attribution of public finance functions among different levels of 
government. We examine Portugal‘s metropolitan transportation sector through the fiscal 
federalist lens, in light of the country‘s decentralization efforts and new relevant legislation. We 
clarify basic principles of fiscal federalism and adapt them to the finance of metropolitan 
transportation systems – typically characterized by multiple jurisdictions, numerous externalities 
and equity concerns – showing the inadequacy of general practice. Portugal‘s overall public 
finance system partially adheres to fiscal federalist principles; the transportation sector less so. 
Metropolitan transportation faces particular troubles, with few direct user fees, prices 
inadequately reflecting costs, and heavy reliance on central government subsidies for public 
transportation investments and operations. A new law creating metropolitan transportation 
authorities is only modestly consistent with fiscal federalist principles, since it inadequately 
details financial responsibilities and remains under heavy central government control. Absent 
additional reforms, the new metropolitan authorities should aim to make the transportation 
finance system explicit and test incentive grants to induce inter-municipal cooperation.  
Keywords: transportation finance, fiscal federalism, metropolitan transportation, Portugal 
1. Introduction 
Fiscal federalism refers to the vertical structure of government authorities and the 
attribution of functions related to revenue collection and expenditures. While theoretical fiscal 
federalism offers well-defined principles for assigning responsibilities, in practice it faces several 
challenges, including institutional inertia and capacity, status quo political power and vested 
interests. Fiscal federalism‘s specific design requires transparency and flexibility, accounting for 
political, economic, and cultural conditions. Metropolitan transportation – which typically 
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crosses local jurisdictions, involves multiple institutions, introduces externalities, and requires 
public-sector participation – could, in theory, benefit from analysis through the fiscal federalist 
framework. 
Portugal‘s metropolitan transportation situation presents an opportune case for usefully 
applying the fiscal federalist optic. The sector depends heavily on central government, with 
discretionary annual appropriations from revenue sources un-linked to the sector or the 
geographic boundary of system benefits and costs. Since most of these accrue at a metropolitan 
scale, fiscal federalism suggests devolving administrative power and most financial 
responsibility to metropolitan-level institutions. While the Portuguese government has been 
decentralizing many services to municipal governments in recent years, the process has been 
relatively ad hoc, with municipalities attempting to do the possible with limited available 
mechanisms and in competition. Over the years national legislative efforts have attempted to 
create metropolitan-level (i.e., inter-municipal) administrative bodies, including for 
transportation. In early 2009 a new national law established the legal framework – including 
administrative and some financial responsibilities – for Metropolitan Transportation Authorities 
(Autoridades Metropolitanas de Transportes, or AMTs) in the nation‘s two largest metropolitan 
areas, Lisbon and Porto.  
While the AMTs were created to support the devolution of transportation administration 
to an ―appropriate‖ functional level, effective AMTs will require adopting fiscal federalism. We 
consider this a relatively universal condition: a more fiscal federalist-consistent metropolitan-
level transportation system will produce ―better‖ outcomes. While we cannot test such a 
hypothesis with a single case, the Portuguese situation illuminates key issues and challenges, 
with the fiscal federalist perspective clarifying pathways for enhancing current reforms in 
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Portugal. The case may offer lessons for others grappling with similar challenges. Application of 
a fiscal federalist lens to the problem may offer generalizable lessons, particularly by analyzing 
additional cases similarly. Ultimately, we aim to show how to improve metropolitan 
transportation administration and performance via the finance system. 
The next section introduces the concept of fiscal federalism and its relevance to 
transportation. The third section describes the context and structure of Portugal‘s transportation 
finance and administration system and analyzes it through the fiscal federalist lens. The fourth 
section assesses the new AMT Law, its implementation to date, and its strengths and weaknesses. 
We follow with a brief discussion of lessons learned and opportunities for the AMT framework 
to enable metropolitan transportation more consistent with fiscal federalism. A final section 
concludes.  
2. Metropolitan Transportation Finance: Theory and Practice 
The finance system plays a pivotal role in the efficiency, fiscal stability, and equity of 
metropolitan
1
 transportation. For transportation users, prices paid should reflect relevant resource 
costs to society, thereby improving efficiency. For planners, a system operating with inaccurate 
prices will distort planning decisions (e.g., Vickrey, 1969) while an explicit and transparent user-
based pricing and revenue system signals justifiable investments and ensures stable revenues. 
The finance system can also structure incentives for metropolitan transportation integration: 
among sectors, such as land use and transportation; among modes, such as private and public 
                                                 
1
 Here metropolitan refers specifically to an urban-regional transportation system that crosses more than one local 
government (e.g., municipality) boundary. 
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transportation; and among and between local, regional, and national governments. Finally, 
finance plays a key role in social equity. 
2.1. Public Goods, Decentralization, and Fiscal Federalism 
Public finance originates in the concept of a public good, which, in economic terms, is 
non-rivaled and non-excludable. In practice, few goods are purely ―public.‖ Whether societies 
treat a certain good as public or private depends on a combination of history, culture, laws, 
ideology, etc. (Douglas, 1992; Kaul y Conceição, 2006).  
Decentralization relates to public finance implementation. Theoretical justifications for 
fiscal decentralization start with Tiebout (1956) and the idea that a person will choose to live in 
the local jurisdiction that provides her utility-maximizing combination of public goods and tax 
rates – an economically efficient outcome. Related arguments for decentralization include: 
increasing accountability and government responsiveness, creating incentives for local 
innovation in service provision, reducing interest group power, building local capacity, and 
improving regional balance of development (e.g., Bahl, 2008). Arguments against 
decentralization include: threats to national economic stability due to local government 
profligacy (Tanzi, 1995); failure to account for inter-jurisdictional externalities, such as 
transportation networks crossing political/administrative boundaries; inefficient tax/subsidy 
competition among local jurisdictions; and diluted technical capability (e.g., Bucovetsky, 1991; 
Prud‘homme, 1995; Bahl, 2008).  
2.1.1. Decentralization, Coordination, and Fiscal Federalism 
Policy/service domains such as transportation, land use, and public health tend to be 
organized functionally (i.e., vertical silos), with potentially different appropriate geographic 
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scales of administration. In practice, these sub-systems are interrelated (i.e., inter-sectoral 
spillovers), requiring some form of inter-sector collaboration or integration (e.g., May et al. 
2005; Stead, 2008). The typical metropolitan challenge: national government is too ―distant‖ 
from the local context to adequately serve the metropolitan ―good,‖ while municipal 
governments have inadequate incentives to think and act beyond their own borders. Fiscal 
federalism offers a formal way to identify how the public finance system can induce effective 
metropolitan governance. Bird and Slack (2007) review various forms of metropolitan 
governance structure – from consolidated, to two-tier, to voluntary, to special districts – and their 
implications for fiscal structures. 
Critical factors in assigning sub-national responsibilities relate to the nature of the service 
in question (e.g., public or private), the spatial extent of relevant externalities, and/or the 
existence of scale economies in service production. Regarding revenues, theory supports central 
government control over highly redistributive taxes, taxes on mobile capital, and taxes on natural 
resources, while ―local‖ control should roughly correspond with user fees (for services) and taxes 
on non-mobile capital (e.g., land) (Oates, 1993). This allows for efficiency and administrative 
ease in revenue collection. For service provision, sub-national governments in a decentralized 
fiscal system will often have to provide more local services than those which can be funded 
entirely locally (due to, e.g., the presence of externalities). This introduces the need to coordinate 
with adjacent and/or higher-level political entities via, for example, financial transfers to resolve 
problems of horizontal (―equal treatment of equals‖) and vertical equity (―unequal treatment of 
unequals‖) and inter-jurisdictional pricing and delivery (e.g., for goods with spillovers or 
externalities). 
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2.1.2. Relevant Principles of Fiscal Federalism 
Fiscal equivalence provides the key theoretical link between administrative and fiscal 
responsibilities: public goods‘ beneficiaries should match with those who pay (Olson, 1969), 
implying sub-national production and resource generation for numerous public goods. Fiscal 
equivalence and user fee financing can lead to improved efficiency, especially if prices closely 
match marginal costs and price signals guide investment and management decisions; and fiscal 
stability, by helping to secure sufficient resources for the relevant service and jurisdiction. Prices 
should also reflect externalities, whether inter-system, intra-system, and/or inter-jurisdictional. 
Even with increased administrative and fiscal autonomy, sub-national governments must still 
face ―hard budget constraints,‖ that is spending limits, to ensure adequate consideration of costs 
and benefits in the case of transfers from higher level governments. The inter-related dimension 
of equity introduces additional challenges, including because societies judge many goods to be 
public and/or ―basic rights‖ (e.g., clean water). Applying these principles should lead to more 
accountable and transparent service investment, operation, and pricing. 
2.2. Fiscal Federalism and Metropolitan Transportation 
Scholars of fiscal federalism often focus on specific local issues, such as education (Calabrese et 
al, 2012) or tax competition (Brueckner, 2004), but rarely examine in detail the transportation 
sector. On the other hand, transportation scholars focusing on finance issues rarely apply, 
explicitly, the fiscal federalist lens. But, metropolitan transportation merits application of this 
lens, as it: 
 is typically, multi-jurisdictional, crossing numerous local governments, implying the 
need for inter-jurisdictional transfers or some other level of administration, normally 
below the national and state/provincial, but above the local/municipal; 
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 produces numerous externalities, positive and negative, which might include labor 
productivity benefits due to increased mobility, air pollution costs, inter-modal network 
effects between public and private transportation modes, and congestion; and, 
 involves equity concerns, such as those relating to societal values about mobility as a 
public good.  
Transportation systems, generally, employ three types of finance mechanisms: direct user 
fees, such as tolls and fares; indirect user/beneficiary fees/taxes, which might include fuel excise 
taxes, vehicle registration and licensing fees, and some forms of land value-related mechanisms, 
such as impact fees and betterment levies; and general taxation, such as sales, income and 
property taxes.
2
 Ideally, the use of these instruments should be guided by the principle of price 
equal to full marginal social cost, such that: 
 infrastructure construction, and maintenance and congestion costs, are recovered via 
time-, place-, and vehicle type-specific prices;  
 energy prices cover the full resource cost and environmental effects directly related to use 
(such as greenhouse gas emissions);  
 local environmental impacts (e.g., air pollution costs) are reflected in environmental fees;  
 local agglomeration and accessibility benefits are regained from land value taxation; and,  
                                                 
2
 These categories are not ―clean‖ in reality. Taxes on fuels or vehicles that reflect a jurisdiction‘s general sales tax 
(e.g., VAT) should not be treated as an indirect transportation user tax; any special excise taxes, however, should be 
(provided they are not levied explicitly for some other purpose, such as an ―education fund‖). At the same time, 
some jurisdictions have special sales tax components earmarked specifically for the transportation sector; some 
governments may also have a component of the general property tax (e.g., VAT) similarly earmarked.  
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 redistributive objectives are achieved through other mechanisms (e.g., World Bank, 
1996).  
At least for roadways, this system would ensure ―efficient‖ use, and provide an adequate source 
of financing (Mohring and Harwitz, 1962; Small, 1993).
3
  
 In practice, few direct user charges, with the exception of public transport fares and tolled 
roads, and no precise user charges tend to be employed. For roadways, despite increases in the 
use of private concessions for metropolitan roadway infrastructure (see Zegras, 2006) – which 
normally introduce some form of marginal cost pricing via tolling – users typically pay for use 
through a mix of indirect mechanisms (e.g., fuel taxes) and general taxation. Since fuel 
consumption is relatively inelastic with respect to price, many governments use fuel taxes as a 
general revenue source rather than a transportation-specific source. Governments sometimes use 
vehicle ownership fees and fuel taxes to redistribute income. Public transportation fares are often 
subsidized, indirectly by subsidizing suppliers or directly by subsidizing certain user groups – 
these may not always achieve socioeconomic equity objectives (e.g., Serebrisky et al, 2009). 
Public transportation subsidies can also be justified in the presence of: scale economies, since the 
right-of-way and capital investment costs are largely insensitive to demand volumes; returns to 
scale of frequency, the so-called ―Mohring effect‖; and, under-priced alternatives, in this case the 
lack of a fully congestion-priced private vehicle system (e.g., Nelson et al., 2007). 
Analytical, institutional, and political complications exist. Valuing externalities remains a 
challenge. Infrastructure-supplying ―agents‖ are often multiple and fractured across 
responsibilities (e.g., construction, maintenance), modes (road, rail) and government levels. 
                                                 
3
 Assuming, again, the absence of scale economies or dis-economies, and that proportional increases in capacity and 
demand leave the unit of congestion unchanged. 
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Formally established, transparent transportation budgets – with fees recognized as prices by 
users – rarely exist, leaving different levels of government scrambling for resources (Zegras, 
2003) and muddying debates regarding taxes, user fees, subsidies, ―rights‖ to mobility, etc. This 
situation almost certainly exerts a negative impact on system sustainability. We now illuminate 
these complexities with a fiscal federalist light on the Portuguese case. 
3. Fiscal Federalism in Portugal 
As Portugal has decentralized, challenges to fulfilling fiscal federalist principles remain, 
impacting efficiency, fiscal stability, and equity. The transportation sector epitomizes these 
challenges. 
The 1976 Constitution of Portugal established a framework for three levels of sub-
national government: regional, municipal, and freguesia (a municipal government sub-division
4
). 
A 1998 national referendum rejected the creation of regionally elected administrations (Syrett 
and Silva, 2001), thus, two elected levels of government exist: central and municipal.  According 
to Inman (2007), Portugal represents a ―unitary democracy,‖ with no politically independent 
Provincial governments,
5
 no guaranteed Provincial representation in the national legislature, and 
a relatively low share of total government revenues raised sub-nationally (thus little ―policy 
discretion‖); characteristics shared with countries like Chile and New Zealand. 
A number of regional authorities depend on the national government for administrative 
and financial support. None have measurably progressed key aspects of fiscal federalism. Five 
regional development commissions (Comissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional - 
                                                 
4
 The remainder of this paper ignores the freguesia, due to its limited responsibility for transportation.  
5
 The Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira are the exceptions. 
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CCDR) correspond to EU statistical geographies and EU Cohesion Fund planning and 
distribution, but these centrally appointed bodies do not match metropolitan scales.
6
 Various 
incarnations of metropolitan organizations have been formally established by law. Most recently, 
a 2008 law (Assembleia da República, 2008) established the Metropolitan Areas of Lisbon and 
Porto (AML and AMP, respectively), identifying 18 and 16 (respectively) municipalities legally 
constituting the associations (Figure 1). The law attributes these associations vague practical 
powers, such as to ―participate in public entities of metropolitan scope‖ including in 
transportation and to ―ensure the coordination of actions‖ among municipal and central 
governments, including for ―mobility and transport.‖ The AML and AMP depend entirely upon 
the municipal and central governments for financing. Within five months of the new 
metropolitan areas law, another law established Metropolitan Transportation Authorities (AMTs) 
for Lisbon and Porto. While the respective AMTs coincide with the AML and AMP constituent 
municipalities, they constitute an entirely separate governing structure. To date, the AML and 
AMP serve primarily coordination and information consolidation roles. The AMTs for Greater 
Lisbon and Greater Porto have yet to be fully implemented (see section 4).  
The country‘s model of metropolitan governance remains loosely coordinated constituent 
municipal activities, with few and fragmented metropolitan administrative powers, subsidiarity 
to municipal governments (Oliveira, 2009; Rayle and Zegras, 2012), and a lack of public finance 
autonomy.   
Table 1 summarizes the acronyms used to refer to the relevant institutions in Portugal.  
                                                 
6
The European Union (EU) also plays a supra-national government role, although with limited powers and 
budgetary size in comparison with a ―typical‖ central government (see Oates, 2002).  
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3.1. Public Finance Basics 
Relative to other OECD countries, Portugal‘s sub-national governments account for a 
small share of total government spending (12.8% vs. an average of 34% for 26 selected OECD 
countries); this share has barely changed since 1985 (Ahmad et al., 2008). The central 
government is responsible for some municipal services, while municipalities are responsible for 
planning and urban development, local roadways, public transportation (except for Lisbon, Porto, 
and now, Coimbra), public housing, and other typical local services (Câmara Municipal de 
Coimbra, 2007; Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2006, 2007; Câmara Municipal do Porto, 2007), 
sometimes in financial cooperation with the central government. 
Taxing power generally follows fiscal federalist principles: the national government 
controls taxes on businesses, labor, and sales, while municipalities can levy land and real estate 
taxes, user fees on local transit, and a small share of corporate taxes. Central government 
controls various special taxes on fuels, motor vehicles, and alcohol, among others (see Nelson, 
2008), as well as road tolls through its infrastructure concessions program. Although 
municipalities have relative autonomy in establishing the tax base and rate (OECD, 1999), 
municipal revenues constitute a small portion (4%) of total government revenues (OECD, 2007). 
The central government administers the tax system, including collection (and transfer) of most 
municipal taxes. 
The central government redistributes domestic general revenues to improve, among 
municipalities, vertical equity (accounting for differences in public service costs) and horizontal 
equity (providing comparable funding levels to comparable municipalities). This includes 
formula funding and discretionary grants for infrastructure investments (the Programa de 
Investimentos e Despesas de Desenvolvimento da Administração Central, PIDDAC). PIDDAC 
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funds are transferred directly to the administrator of the capital project, whether a national 
ministry, a municipality, or a state-owned enterprise (MFAP, 2010a). Such programs may not 
always meet desired outcomes. First, the PIDDAC program is discretionary, with funding highly 
dependent on political processes. Second, transfers to the state owned-enterprise sector (Sector 
Empresarial do Estado, SEE), such as support for public transport, might favor the two largest 
metropolitan areas, Lisbon and Porto (see section 3.3).  
Portugal generally benefits from transfers under the EU‘s Cohesion Policy,7 designed to 
minimize horizontal imbalances among member states. These include general funds for 
economic convergence, regional competitiveness, and cross-border cooperation, as well as 
specific sectoral funds such as the trans-European transportation networks (TEN-T).
8
 
Table 2 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the Portuguese political system vis-
à-vis fiscal federalism. 
 
3.2. Transport Finance and Metropolitanism: Description 
Two central government ministries control most national and sub-national transportation 
planning, finance, and investment: Finance (Ministerio das Finanças, or MF) and Economics 
and Employment, through its Secretary of State for Public Works, Transport, and 
Communications (Secretário de Estado das Obras Públicas, Transportes e Comunicações, or 
                                                 
7
 Portugal is a net beneficiary, receiving €3.95 billion in transfers compared to €2.31 billion in contributions, 
accounting for about 3% of the country‘s total €84 billion forecast public expenditures (MFAP, 2010a). 
8
 These include the high-speed railway axis of southwest Europe (Priority Axes 3 and 19), the multimodal axis 
connecting the Iberian Peninsula with the rest of Europe (Priority Axis 8), and the freight railway axis from 
Portuguese container ports to Madrid and Paris (Priority Axis 16) (European Commission, 2005). 
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SEOPTC).
9
 The MF authorizes all funding and disbursement and regulates the SEE, which 
controls several key transportation assets across modes and jurisdictions. The SEOPTC is 
primarily responsible for planning and regulation, including regulating public-private highway 
concessions. The Mobility and Land Transport Institute (Instituto da Mobilidade e dos 
Transportes Terrestres or IMTT), an independent national agency, supervises and regulates 
public transportation systems, primarily rail and public transportation, while the Roadway 
Infrastructures Institute (Instituto de Infra-Estruturas Rodoviárias IP or InIR) regulates the 
highway concession system. Figure 2 depicts the national transportation institutional landscape.  
As mentioned, CCDRs play a regional planning role in EU investments but have little additional 
power. Municipalities have the typical responsibilities for local transportation, including local 
street networks and related activities such as parking, signage, and pedestrian infrastructure. 
Municipalities also have local public transportation system responsibilities, except in the major 
metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, where the SEE provides many public transit services. 
Transportation finance in Portugal only indirectly links costs to prices and benefits. With 
the partial exceptions of tolled highways and public transport fares and parking prices, most 
transportation resources come from general taxes – linked to the geography of transportation 
activity only insofar as tax revenues relate to population density and economic activity and that 
these, in turn, relate to transportation intensity. Two national vehicle taxes—a circulation tax and 
                                                 
9
 Until 2011, the Ministry of Finance went by the name Finance and Public Administration and the SEOPTC was a 
separate Ministry since subsumed by the Ministry of Economy. The national ministry responsible for the agriculture, 
ocean, environment, planning, and regional development (Ministério do Agricultura, do Mar, e do Ordenamento do 
Território) coordinates national and metropolitan land use planning and assures compliance of all projects with 
environmental laws. 
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a vehicle tax—accrue to general national coffers (MFAP, 2010a). A portion of national excise 
taxes on gasoline (11%) and diesel (24%) are dedicated to Estradas de Portugal (EP), the quasi-
privatized national highway agency. These funds can be used for capital or operating costs 
(Assembleia da República, 2007; OECD & European Environmental Agency, 2008). Thus, fuel 
taxes partly link vehicle use to highway expenditures. In 2009, the Portuguese state collected just 
under €3 billion in revenues from petroleum products and another €820 million in vehicle taxes. 
Approximately €555 million of fuel taxes were dedicated to EP. On a discretionary basis, the 
Portuguese government spent €107 million (out of €2.1 billion) on PIDDAC projects for 
―transportation and communications‖ (of which €14 million consisted of local co-financing). 
Through the SEE, the government spent €260 million on subsidies for transportation state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private-sector concessionaires. Nearly €180 million of SEE subsidies 
went to public transportation operations in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas in 2010 
(Table 3).  
Recent reforms of the SEE have focused on greater administrative independence, 
transferring sector debts off the central government‘s balance sheet, and securing private finance. 
The transportation sector‘s fiscal situation has not improved. Over the period 2005-2010, public 
sector income (from all sources, including social security) increased by 3.9% annually (MFAP, 
2005; 2007; 2010); total SEE subsidies increased by 5.9% annually; while total subsidies to 
metropolitan transportation operations (both SOEs and private operators) in Lisbon and Porto 
increased by 12% annually (Table 3). 
An urban light rail system which opened in 2007 in several municipalities in Greater 
Lisbon‘s south bank is illustrative. Originally conceived of by a group of municipal governments 
and envisioned to be financed exclusively via user fees and delivered via a public-private 
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concession (Governo da República Portuguesa, 1999), the Metro Transportes do Sul (MTS) 
project was eventually taken over by the central government (delivered and operated by private 
concession). Delayed by conflicts with affected local governments, the project suffered from 
overly-optimistic cost estimates and ridership projections.
10
 Over 63% of the estimated €393 
million in capital costs were financed by the central government, which also offered minimum 
revenue guarantees to the concessionaire (Câmara Municipal de Almada, 2008; Monteiro, 2007); 
the EU provided 19% of the investment costs, the concessionaire 14%, and municipalities 4% 
(Gouveia, 2008; Lino, 2007). In 2010, the 15-km, 19 station MTS system incurred central 
government operating subsidies estimated at €8 million (MF, 2011), implying a subsidy of €0.27 
per passenger kilometer transported (PKT) – more than 16 times higher than the per PKT 
operating subsidy provided to the Lisbon Metro.
11
 
3.3. Transport Finance and Metropolitanism: Analysis 
Portugal‘s metropolitan transportation poses a fiscal federalist challenge. Much of the 
central government-controlled and financed transportation system serves largely regionalized 
economic and functional purposes (at least with respect to passenger transport). This includes 
urban public transit (urban rail, bus, and ferry), regional and commuter rail and ferry services, 
and roadways serving mostly urban commuter traffic. Although the highway public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) have introduced tolling, in-line with fiscal federalist principles, tolled 
facilities remain limited in the metropolitan areas themselves. In any case, the central 
government retains policy control over the highway PPPs. 
                                                 
10
 In 2010, the system recorded 23.9 million PKT, 33% of the forecast (Tribunal de Contas, 2011). 
11
 In 2009, the last year for which data are publicly available, the Lisbon Metro carried 829.1 million PKT 
(Metropolitano de Lisboa, 2010) with €13.9 million in subsidy, or approximately €0.02 per PKT. 
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The situation hampers fulfillment of fiscal federalism‘s principles. Subsidizing public 
transportation operations (and, arguably, investments) can be justified on intra-system 
externalities grounds, since auto use is under-priced in congested metropolitan areas. But, 
Portugal‘s current metropolitan subsidy structure – directly resulting from SEE negotiations with 
the SOEs and from national government contracts with private companies – pays little heed to 
intra-system externalities, as evidenced by the recent rapid increase in operating subsidies (Table 
3). System efficiency likely suffers. These subsidies may serve socioeconomic equity goals, 
although their effectiveness would require detailed analysis (e.g., Serebrisky et al., 2009).  
Regarding geographic equity, or fiscal equivalency, available information precludes a 
detailed analysis, due to the lack of geographic granularity regarding origins of relevant revenues 
and destinations of expenditures. The modest sectoral investments via PIDDAC funds are 
distributed relatively broadly throughout the country. The SEE expenditures for transportation, 
more than double the PIDDAC funds, may indicate the general tendency in light of Portugal‘s 
demographic and economic geography. Greater Lisbon, including the south bank peninsula, 
accounts for 26% of the nation‘s population and 37% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (INE, 
2008) and receives approximately 26% of total SEE subsidies specifically for its public 
transportation operations. Greater Porto accounts for 12% of the nation‘s population and 12% of 
GDP and receives approximately 9% of total SEE subsidies for its public transportation services 
(INE, 2008).  In addition, substantial percentages of metropolitan transportation operating 
revenues are derived from user fees and local sources (Figure 3). Thus, the large metropolitan 
areas are not necessarily getting ―more than they should‖ in terms of central government public 
transport support. Rather, the concerns are poor explicit fiscal equivalency and subsequent lack 
of transparency and local accountability and the potential appearance of regional inequities.  This 
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may also be contributing to the rapid growth in operating subsidies to state-owned and private 
public transit operators in the metropolitan areas, epitomized most recently by the newly opened 
MTS on Lisbon‘s south bank. This trend clearly violates fiscal federalism‘s hard budget 
constraint principle, countering any incentive to reform pricing, investment, and management 
while also not helping to stabilize Portugal‘s macroeconomic picture.  
  
In summary, metropolitan transportation in Portugal suffers from various inconsistencies 
regarding efficiency, financial stability, and equitable service and infrastructure delivery (see 
Table 4). Fiscal federalism suggests that transportation expenditures should be derived primarily 
from metropolitan sources. More clearly aligning these expenditures with direct revenue sources 
would make the costs and benefits recognizable to the relevant stakeholders. Public 
transportation fares partly achieve this, but the increasing SEE subsidies to operators (public and 
private) suggest beneficiaries are not facing the costs implied. The move towards tolled highway 
PPPs might increase efficiency and fiscal equivalence, but widespread adoption of tolling, 
especially congestion-pricing, in the metropolitan areas seems unlikely in the short-term. 
Furthermore, the PPP contracts and regulatory structure may impede efficient system-wide 
pricing and management relating to congestion pricing and inter-modality. In the meantime, the 
reliance on partial earmarking of national fuel taxes, themselves imperfect roadway user fees, 
mixed with general taxes and unclear criteria for spatial redistribution of the funds blurs the 
picture. Metropolitan areas, thus, depend highly on central government for transportation 
investment and operating resources and have little direct control over metropolitan-scale 
transportation policies. 
In this case, a regional government enjoying administrative autonomy, consent from the 
governed, sufficient fiscal autonomy, and hard-budget constraints has a higher likelihood of 
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arriving at a socially optimal outcome by aligning supply and demand via prices. Even where 
direct user fees are inefficient or impractical, an empowered metropolitan transportation 
authority would, at least in theory, more closely align costs to beneficiaries through indirect user 
fees and taxes. Do the newly created AMTs hold promise towards this end?  
4. Fiscal Federalism and the Portuguese AMT Law 
A 2009 Law gives the AMTs responsibility for public transportation, including planning, 
coordination and regulation, financing and pricing, service promotion and development, 
integration with local land use plans, operational planning, and strategic planning specifically to 
―promote‖ the development of urban mobility plans (plano de deslocações urbanas or PDU), in 
technical collaboration with the IMTT, the national land transportation regulatory body (Table 5). 
AMTs are also responsible for promoting the development of operational programs for 
transportation (Programa Operacional de Transportes or POT), a legal instrument defining, for a 
four-year period, necessary aspects of passenger transport in metropolitan areas, including: 
public transport itineraries, service levels, fares, traffic, parking, costs, and financing. As 
described above, the AMTs function as institutions legally separate from the metropolitan areas 
(AMP and AML), although the latter do have responsibility for appointing some members of the 
AMTs‘ General Councils.12 
The AMT law offers a reasonable institutional framework for applying fiscal federalist 
principles to regional transportation in the Lisbon and Porto metropolitan areas. Nonetheless, 
unclear language about real fiscal power and tools suggests that the AMTs may be unable to 
implement metropolitan transportation policies in the spirit of fiscal federalism. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
12
 This provides evidence of some effort to coordinate between the metropolitan areas (AMP and AML) and their 
respective AMTs.  
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dominance of central government appointees on the various AMT councils perpetuates the heavy 
national influence in metropolitan transportation.
13
  
As of late 2011, the AMTs have been ―legally‖ implemented, but remain functioning at a 
very low level of activity, currently examining the possibilities to reform public transport 
operations through mergers (suggesting the government may be using the AMTs as a ―scapegoat‖ 
for any negative effects of pushing through institutional reform). With the nation‘s ongoing 
financial crisis, no budget has been allocated to finance AMT activities. While council members 
and some administrative employees have been appointed, most are still waiting for orders and 
budget and remain employed by other agencies. Without a specific budget allocation, the AMTs 
will not likely initiate any of the substantive activities prescribed in law. In theory, the AMTs 
reflect modest steps in the ―right‖ direction. Still they focus primarily on public transportation, 
have little actual recourse to financial instruments, and remain dominated by central government. 
In practice, the lack of any movement on AMT formation two years after the law passed signals 
uncertainty regarding any power eventually accruing to them. 
5. Discussion 
Similar to many other countries, metropolitan governance in Portugal remains a challenge. 
In Lisbon and Porto, metropolitan governance is a mix of occasional, ad-hoc, and limited 
voluntary cooperation among municipalities and a few special-purpose bodies. In this respect the 
                                                 
13
 The Central Government appoints the president and two vice presidents of the AMT Executive Council and over 
50% of the members of the General Council (which serves as a supervisory role over the Executive Council). The 
law does provide for more prominent representation by the center cities of Lisbon and Porto in their respective AMT 
General Councils, in some attempt to reflect these cities dominance in terms of metropolitan travel demand. 
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country shares characteristics with, for example, Brazil and Argentina (Bird and Slack, 2007). 
General metropolitan authority legislation, and transportation-specific legislation have attempted 
to create a new tier of governance, but with little impact to date. As Bird and Slack (2007) 
suggest for Latin America, effective metropolitan governance requires an appropriate fiscal 
structure.  
Our analysis shows that such a structure does not yet exist in Portugal. Metropolitan 
public transportation planning, investment, and regulation in the country are challenged by issues 
of efficiency, fiscal stability, and equity. Existing incentives promote the delivery of quantities 
(of infrastructure, services) without adequately controlling quality or need, resulting in 
inefficient resource allocation. Some of these issues require modest institutional change, such as 
establishment and use of formal project evaluation procedures as a requirement for public 
investments. However, the lack of a direct link between costs and benefits is increasing debt and 
subsidy requirements for metropolitan transportation entities. Local instability arises from de 
facto dependence on the central government. The central government, in turn, runs the risk of 
having to unexpectedly assign additional resources, with little consideration for horizontal or 
vertical equity. This situation could further imperil the nation‘s financial stability and its 
compliance with the EU‘s macro-economic requirements (to be fair, estimated metropolitan-
level transportation subsidies make up a minor share of annual government expenditures; an 
estimated 0.2%). Regarding the hypothesis that decentralization might increase the risk of lower-
level government bailouts, metropolitan public transportation in Portugal offers no support – 
increasing subsidy levels persist even with central government financial responsibility. 
Current institutional arrangements could adversely affect inter-regional equity and intra-
regional efficiency, especially for metropolitan public transportation. Lisbon‘s and Porto‘s public 
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transportation services are provided primarily by companies that depend substantially on central 
government subsidies, violating fiscal equivalency. In other Portuguese cities, such responsibility 
rests solely with municipalities and local users and taxpayers, more closely adhering to fiscal 
equivalency. As such, the system manifests a ―partial‖ fiscal equivalency for public 
transportation operations, but potential, or at least perceived, inequity in favor of residents in the 
nation‘s largest metropolitan areas.    
The evidence indicates the difficulty with ―metropolitanizing‖ transportation in Portugal, 
with the AMTs apparently lacking the requisite administrative and fiscal powers to advance this 
objective. By targeting specifically Lisbon and Porto, the law may further exacerbate the 
perceptions of bias towards these metropolitan areas. By focusing primarily on public 
transportation, the law does not enable broader intermodal, intra-system management and 
financing of the overall mobility system. The AMTs remain a heavily top-down solution, 
evidenced by the Portuguese Government‘s control over the majority of appointments for both 
the General and Executive Councils. The AMTs have been given some paper responsibility for 
planning, but with no link to funding instruments. The AMTs also have no direct access to 
investment sources such as PIDDAC funds. According to the law, the AMTs should 
predict/anticipate the need for subsidies in transport operations and the respective resources for 
funding them. However, the ability of the AMTs to mediate between the SEE and Finance 
Ministry remains to be seen. The AMTs will not likely be able to move towards enforceable 
fiscal discipline of sub-national governments. Finally, regulatory responsibilities remain 
somewhat murky, in the unclear relationship between the AMTs and IMTT.   
For effective sub-national transportation administration and finance in Portugal, AMTs 
need greater independence from the central government and fuller representation from citizens 
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within the corresponding geographic boundaries. Institutionally, the AMTs could take a first step 
in the right direction by undertaking a detailed assessment of the nation‘s transportation finance 
system, making the system explicit and transparent, following the fiscal federalist principles 
outlined in this paper. Such an activity appears to fall within the AMTs‘ legal purview and, 
presumably, the AMTs would have access to key budgetary details unavailable to us. The central 
government could also test the effectiveness of, and build the capacity of, the AMTs by 
endowing them with some grant-making capabilities. For example, Rayle and Zegras (2012), in 
an analysis of inter-municipal collaboration in Portugal, find evidence supporting the role of 
financial incentives in inducing such collaboration. Perhaps the AMTs could be enabled to 
deploy modest sums for projects of inter-municipal interest, which also seems consistent with the 
AMT Law. In the end, however, the current law suggests the AMTs may simply represent 
another organization overlaid on a complex institutional architecture, adding yet one more player 
to the fight for limited resources. 
6. Conclusion 
Fiscal federalism refers to the attribution of administrative, taxing, and spending powers 
among the different levels of government in a decentralized system. Within fiscal federalism, the 
metropolitan transportation sector is relevant due to its importance to economic and social 
development, the multiple layers of government involved, and the key role the public sector 
plays in service provision, operation, investment, and regulation. Numerous countries around the 
world are struggling with creating better institutions for metropolitan transportation management.  
We examined metropolitan transportation through the lens of fiscal federalism in a 
(slowly) decentralizing country, Portugal, within the quasi-federalist EU system. Our analysis 
revealed Portugal‘s ongoing challenges in financing metropolitan transportation systems. 
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Fundamentally, Portuguese surface transportation lacks an explicit finance system. The nation‘s 
highway PPP system is partly changing this picture via direct tolling, although PPP tolling in 
metropolitan areas remains limited. Generally, the existing incentives promote the delivery of 
quantities, with little emphasis on evaluation, heavy dependence on the central government, and 
risks of financial instability. The lack of a meaningfully direct and transparent connection 
between the benefits and costs accruing to users reduces the efficiency of both output and the 
collection and use of nearly all revenue sources. In terms of fiscal equivalency, the system plays 
out unevenly across Portuguese urban areas – the two largest metropolitan areas depend largely 
on the central government for public transport operations, while other municipalities mostly fend 
for themselves. This ―partial‖ fiscal equivalency may favor the largest metropolitan areas, 
although we cannot be sure due to data limitations. Public transportation finance violates fiscal 
equivalency, with few incentives to match benefits with expenditures. Risks to the sustainability 
of the subsidized services and to greater macroeconomic stability exist. 
A new law creating metropolitan transportation authorities (AMTs) in Lisbon and Porto 
will not likely ameliorate the fundamental challenges, offering little detail on financial 
instruments and responsibilities and project evaluation requirements. Ultimately, reform must 
assign responsibility for transportation administration and finance to sub-national governments 
and create explicit metropolitan transportation finance systems. Such reform may require 
changes in the governance system to allow for financially and politically autonomous 
metropolitan areas. In the short term, infrastructure investment projects require application of 
transparent and rigorous project evaluation procedures and the creation of stronger co-financing 
requirements by local governments. Increased private-sector participation (via, e.g., 
infrastructure concessions) could move in that direction. The AMTs could also theoretically 
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move in this direction, including by conducting an explicit transport system finance analysis 
through the fiscal federalist lens and serving as an institution for deploying grants for inter-
municipal cooperation. Reform of Portugal‘s transportation finance system remains a question of 
―when?‖ The government must minimize inefficiencies and inequities in the public finance 
system; transportation offers an opportunity towards that end. 
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Table 1 
Principal Institutional Acronyms 
 
Acronym Portuguese Name English Translation 
AML Área Metropolitana de Lisboa Metropolitan Area of Lisbon 
AMP Área Metropolitan do Porto Metropolitan Area of Porto 
AMT Autoridad Metropolitana de Transportes Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority 
CCDR Comissões de Coordenação e 
Desenvolvimento Regional - CCDR 
Regional Development and 
Coordination Commission 
EP Estradas de Portugal  
IMTT Instituto da Mobilidade e dos 
Transportes Terrestres 
Mobility and Land Transport 
Institute 
InIR Instituto de Infra-Estruturas Rodoviárias  Roadway Infrastructures Institute 
MF Ministerio das Finanças Ministry of Finance 
MTS Metro Transportes do Sul Metro Transport of the South (light 
rail line on south bank of Lisbon’s 
Tagus River)  
PIDDAC Programa de Investimentos e Despesas 
de Desenvolvimento da Administração 
Central 
Central Administration Program of 
Development Investments and 
Expenditures 
SEE Sector Empresarial do Estado State-owned Enterprise Sector 
SEOPTC Secretário de Estado das Obras 
Públicas, Transportes e Comunicações 
Secretary of State for Public Works, 
Transportation and Communication 
Table 1
Table 2 
Fiscal Federalism and Sub-national Governance in Portugal. 
Concept Consistencies Inconsistencies 
Decentralization and 
fiscal equivalence 
• Allocation of powers for most 
local services to municipalities 
• Municipal discretion to set local 
tax levies (e.g., property taxes) and 
portions of income taxes 
• CCDR boundaries inconsistent with 
metropolitan areas 
• Central government controls some 
municipal services and retains great 
share of revenue-raising and 
expenditure powers  
Legitimacy of 
authority & 
accountability 
• Local governments directly 
elected by voters 
• District governments, and CCDRs 
are deconcentrated arms of central 
government, not directly elected and 
independent 
• Central government appointment of 
AMT leadership 
Efficient levying & 
collecting of taxes 
• Central government collects 
highly mobile taxes  
• Municipalities collect local 
property taxes, some local user fees, 
and some corporate income taxes 
• Central government collects and 
remits local taxes (e.g. property 
taxes), but local governments cannot 
audit 
• Regional government entities cannot 
generate own revenues  
Internalizing spatial 
spillovers & 
externalities 
• Administrative districts, CCDRs, 
AMTs, and voluntary municipal 
coalitions, in theory 
• SEE administers and raises funds 
for many national services and 
infrastructures 
• SEE administers many services and 
infrastructures with sub-national 
impacts 
• Municipal coalitions not empowered 
with sufficient authority or budget 
Equity (vertical and 
horizontal) 
• EU cohesion and domestic 
equalization funds 
• Questionable equity of SEE’s 
distribution of subsidies 
•  PIDDAC funds are discretionary 
and unpredictable 
Notes: CCDR – regional development and coordination commissions; AMT – metropolitan transport authorities; 
SEE – state-owned enterprise sector; EU – European Union; PIDDAC – investment and expenditure program of 
central administration. 
 
Table 2
Table 3 
Operating Subsidies to Surface Transportation Companies in Lisbon and Porto. 
Item 
€ Millions  AAGR 
(05-10) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2010 
State-owned Enterprises 
Carris (bus/tram in Greater Lisbon) 42.5 45.5 48.6 52.1 56.5 58.7 6.7% 
Metropolitano de Lisboa (ML) 21.2 22.7 24.3 26.1 29.0 31.1 8.0% 
STCP (bus services for Greater Porto) 15.3 16.3 17.5 19.4 21.5 20.7 6.2% 
Metro do Porto (MP)a 2.4 2.5 10.9 13.0 13.9 13.2 40.6% 
Transtejo (water ferry in Greater Lisbon) 5.3 5.6 6.0 6.4 7.0 7.2 6.3% 
Soflusa (water ferry in Greater Lisbon) 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.9 5.1 6.6% 
CP Lisbonb 5.4 4.6 n.i. 14 9 15.2 23.0% 
CP Portob 6.3 4.8 n.i. 13.9 15.3 16.5 21.2% 
Total SOE subsidies 102.1 105.9 111.5 149.4 157.1 167.7 10.4% 
 
Private Companies 
Fertagus (rail in Greater Lisbon) 5.2 10.4 12.6 11.6 11.3 11.3 16.8% 
Rodaviaria Lisboa (bus in Greater 
Lisbon) 2.4 4.3 2.1 4.2 2.5 6.2 
20.9% 
Scotturb (bus in Greater Lisbon) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.09 11.9% 
TST (bus in Greater Lisbon) 1.8 2.7 1.4 2.8 1.7 4.4 19.2% 
Vimeca (bus in Greater Lisbon) 2.0 2.9 1.4 2.8 1.8 4.4 17% 
MTS (south bank light rail service)     0.07 8.0 n.a. 
Total Private Subsidies  11.5 20.3 17.5 21.5 17.4 34.4 24.5% 
 
Total Lisbon 89.6 102.6 100.6 124.6 123.7 143.7 9.9% 
Total Porto 24 23.6 28.4 46.3 50.7 50.4 16.0% 
Total Metropolitan Transport Subsidies 101.1 122.9 118.2 146.0 141.1 178.1 12.0% 
Total SEE Subsidies (all Sectors) 371.3 399.5 413.5 410.8 456.2 494.5 5.9% 
Sources: CP, 2006, 2009, 2010; MFAP, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010b; MF, 2011. Notes: 
a 
Increased expenditures in 
2007 reflect system expansions completed in 2006 (MP, 2008a,b); 
b
 CP figures are indicative, not necessarily 
exactly comparable to the other subsidies reported; these are the operating losses reported by CP, which are roughly 
consistent with the total CP subsidies reported by MFAP (which does note disaggregate CP subsidies by service 
area). n.i.- no information (losses not reported for 2007); n.a. – not applicable. 
 
Table 3
Table 4 
Fiscal Federalism and Metropolitan Transportation in Portugal 
Ideal Consistencies Inconsistencies 
Decentralization and 
fiscal equivalence 
• Municipal governments control local 
roads, parking, and most local transit 
systems 
• Dedicated local public transport 
funding in a few small cities 
• Central government authority and 
subsidy (via SEE) of sub-national 
transport infrastructure and services                       
• Pricing of metropolitan transport 
not consistent with costs  
Legitimacy of 
authority & 
accountability  
• Local transport infrastructure is 
generally controlled by locally-elected 
officials in smaller municipalities 
• Central government controls many 
transportation assets and services 
with regional and/or local impacts 
Efficient levying and 
collecting of taxes 
• Municipalities collect locally derived 
transport-related taxes and local bus 
fares (except in Lisbon and Porto) 
• Central government collects fuel 
excise taxes 
• Regional transport infrastructure 
and services highly dependent on 
discretionary central government 
transfers 
Internalizing spatial 
spillovers & 
externalities 
• Government-granted monopolies over 
transit in Lisbon and Porto metropolitan 
areas helps internalize regional 
decision-making 
• Voluntary program for the creation 
of regional partnerships has failed to 
produce much progress in regional 
transit planning and administration 
Equity (vertical and 
horizontal) 
• EU Cohesion, PIDDAC, and central 
formula funds help promote horizontal 
equity in transportation 
• Bias of national transportation 
investment to roadways  
• Nearly all public transit capital 
support goes to two metropolitan 
areas 
 
 
Table 4
Table 5 
Metropolitan Transport Authority Responsibilities According to Portuguese AMT Law 
Responsibility Specific Attributes 
Strategic 
Planning 
- promote the development of urban mobility plans (PDUs) and operational 
programs for transport (POTs) 
- develop mobility surveys 
- promote preparation of public accounts of passenger mobility on public 
transportation 
- provide opinions on/analysis of municipal land use plans 
- assure integration between public transport modes and coordination with traffic 
and parking policies 
- promote alternative traffic and parking policies to increase public transportation 
attractiveness 
Coordination 
and Regulation 
- promote mechanisms to increase inter-operability and inter-modality among the 
various public transport operators 
- define metropolitan traffic and parking policies to promote public transport 
attractiveness 
- define the guiding principles and approaches for metropolitan service integration, 
via delegation to municipal associations or concessions to third parties 
- develop coordinated actions to improve quality, safety and environmental 
protection in public transport operations 
- assure gradual and progressive contracting of public transport services, without 
violating the responsibilities of IMTT 
- assure the public service contracts with private operators of road-based public 
transportation 
- monitor and evaluate the quality and efficiency of public transportation services 
- enforce relevant laws and regulations (contracts, concessions) in cooperation with 
IMTT 
- apply sanctions and penalties according to the law or operating contracts 
Financing and 
Pricing 
- anticipate the inherent public service obligations of transportation and the 
respective financial compensation required 
- promote the establishment mechanisms to regulate, program, incent, and 
financially support fleet purchase/renewal, information systems, and new 
technologies for urban transport, in cooperation with IMTT 
- establish rules, within the terms of the law, regarding coordinating mobility taxes 
for the metropolitan areas and their corresponding municipalities.  
- consider and apply principles and fares for the transport system, its integration, and 
parking of metropolitan interest 
- consider, implement and coordinate a metropolitan ticketing system 
- regulate the commercialization of multimodal transport services and the 
redistribution of revenues in function of services provided by each operator   
Dissemination 
and 
Development 
- develop and promote the urban transport image and promote public transport use 
- disseminate service information, creating and managing information and 
communication services with the operators 
- promote innovative technology initiatives and services to improve quality, service 
and mobility 
- support, participate and finance research in urban transport and mobility 
- promote and implement innovative projects and pilot programs 
Table 5
Source: Assembleia da República, 2009. 
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Fig. 1. Municipalities in the Porto Metropolitan Area (AMP) (top) and Lisbon Metropolitan 
Area (AML) (bottom). (Instituto Geográfico Portugués (http://mapas.igeo.pt), Assembleia da 
República, 2008). Notes: Inset shows (in dark) the AMP and AML within continental Portugal 
(Municipal borders shown); Municipalities named are those legally included in the respective 
metropolitan areas. 
Figure 1
 Fig. 2. Institutional Structure of Portugal’s National Transportation Sector (adapted from 
Dunn, 2010).  
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Fig. 3. Transportation Finance Geography in the Lisbon and Porto Metropolitan Areas. 
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